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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Petitioner-Appellant, Dale Carter Shackelford ("Shackelford"), appeals from the
denial of his successive post-conviction petition stemming from his trial that resulted in
two death sentences, but was subsequently remanded by the Idaho Supreme Court for
resentencing.

Shackelford's successive post-conviction appeal has been consolidated

with the appeal from the denial of his post-conviction petition stemming from his
resentencing where he was given two consecutive fixed life sentences.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The facts leading to Shackelford's convictions were summarized by the Idaho
Supreme Court in State v. Shackelford (Shackelford I), 150 Idaho 355, 361-62, 247 P.3d
582 (2010) (footnote omitted), as follows:
Dale Shackelford was convicted of the murders of his ex-wife,
Donna Fontaine, and her boyfriend, Fred Palahniuk, which occurred near
the Latah County town of Kendrick, Idaho, in May 1999. The State
alleged that Shackelford conspired with Martha Millar, Bernadette
Lasater, Mary Abitz, Sonja Abitz, and, John Abitz. Millar and Lasater
worked for Shackelford' s trucking business, Shackelford Enterprises, in
Missouri. The Abitz family lived near the residence where the bodies of
Donna and Fred were found. Sonja Abitz was Shackelford's fiancee at the
time of the murders, and John and Mary Abitz are Sonja's parents. The
alleged conspirators eventually pled guilty to charges related to the
murders.
Shackelford and Donna married in Missouri in December 1995 and
the relationship ended in the summer of 1997, with the couple divorcing in
November of that year. Donna accused Shackelford of raping her in July
1997, and charges were filed in 1998. In the spring of 1999, Donna
developed a relationship with Fred and, on May 28, 1999, the two visited
Donna's brother, Gary Fontaine, at the home Gary and Donna's daughter
owned together outside of Kendrick. The morning of May 29, Donna,
Fred, and Gary went to the Locust Blossom Festival in Kendrick, where
they met John, Mary, and Sonja Abitz.
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After leaving the festival, Gary went to the Abitz' s house, but he
left around dark, returned home, noticed Donna's pickup in the driveway,
and smelled smoke. Gary called the Abitz's house and reported that his
two-story garage was on fire. Mary, Sonja, Ted Meske (Mary's brother),
and Shackelford arrived at the fire and various individuals tried to
extinguish it, but were unsuccessful.
At 7 :40 p.m., Latah County Sheriff Patrol Deputy Richard Skiles
was called to investigate the fire at 2168 Three Bear Road. When Skiles
arrived at the scene, nearly an hour later, he observed several persons including Gary Fontaine, Mary Abitz, Sonja Abitz, Brian Abitz (Sonja's
brother), Ted Meske, and Shackelford- standing near the garage that was
completely engulfed in flames. Based upon information obtained from
Ted and Shackelford, Deputy Skiles contacted dispatch to have an on-call
detective sent "because there was a possibility there could be a suicide
victim in the fire." By the time the fire department arrived, the garage had
been utterly destroyed. Several hours later, after the fire had been
extinguished, two bodies were found in the rubble. The bodies were
subsequently identified as the remains of Donna and Fred. At trial, a state
fire investigator testified as to his opinion that the fire was arson.
Doctor Robert Cihak conducted autopsies of the remains, which
were severely burned. Shotgun pellets were found in Donna's right chest
region and a bullet was found in the back of her neck. Dr. Cihak opined
that the bullet wound was fatal and was inflicted when Donna was still
alive. A bullet was also found in Fred's body behind the upper
breastbone, which Dr. Cihak concluded was the cause of death. Dr. Cihak
offered his opinion that Donna and Fred were dead at the time of the fire.
An Indictment was filed charging Shackelford with two counts of first-degree
murder, first-degree arson, two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder,
conspiracy to commit arson, and preparing false evidence. (#27966, R., pp.1-4.) 1 At the
conclusion of his trial, a jury found Shackelford guilty of all the charged offenses. (Id.,
pp.2223-31.)

The district court subsequently found the state proved two statutory

Contemporaneously with the filing of this brief, the state has filed a Motion to Take
Judicial Notice requesting this Court take judicial notice of the Clerk's Records and
Reporter's Transcripts in Shackelford's underlying capital case and his resentencing. The
state will refer to the records and transcripts by their respective Idaho Supreme Court
numbers, and to Shackelford's opening brief as "Brief."
1

2

aggravating factors involving Donna's murder, one statutory aggravating factor involving
Fred's murder, weighed the collective mitigation against each individual statutory
aggravator, and sentenced Shackelford to death for both murders. (Id., pp.3082-3116.)
As to the remaining crimes, Shackelford was given a fixed twenty-five years for firstdegree arson, fixed life for one count of conspiracy to commit murder, a fixed twentyfive years for the second count of conspiracy to commit murder, and a fixed five years for
preparing false evidence, all to run concurrently with each other. (Id., pp.3123-25.)
With the assistance of the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD"),
Shackelford filed his initial post-conviction petition (#31928, R., pp.10-35), a third
amended petition (id., pp.2534-2642), and an addendum to his third amended petition
(id., pp.2980-90). The district court denied his motion to file a second addendum to the
third amended petition.

(Id., pp.3175-182, 3196-3429, 3438-41.)

The district court

granted Shackelford sentencing relief, concluding, based upon Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584 (2002), that the jury was mandated to conduct the weighing process in death penalty
cases and, therefore, ordering that Shackelford's death sentences be "set aside." (#31928,

R., pp.3580-84.) Based upon the decision to provide Shackelford sentencing relief, the
court concluded three other sentencing claims were moot.

(Id., pp.3628-29.) All of

Shackelford's remaining guilt and sentencing claims were denied. (Id., pp.3569-3631.)
Shackelford and the state appealed. (#31928, R., pp.3702-09.) In a consolidated
appeal pursuant to LC. § 19-2719, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Shackelford's
convictions, prison sentences, and the determination that Shackelford had to be
resentenced for both first-degree murders, albeit on different grounds, concluding the jury
did not find the statutory aggravating factors and that the error was not harmless.
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Shackelford I, 150 Idaho at 386-88. Both parties' petitions for certiorari were denied on
March 7, 2011. Shackelford v. Idaho, 562 U.S. 1272 (2011); Idaho v. Shackelford, 562
U.S. 1279 (2011).
On March 18, 2011, Shackelford filed a "[Successive] Petition for PostConviction Relief Capital Case" ("Successive Petition") (#42331-2014, R., pp.18-42)
(brackets in original), and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel (id., pp.15-17). 2 The
state filed an answer (id., pp.43-55) and a Motion for Summary Disposition (id., pp.7375). On July 8, 2011, the district court denied all pending motions and suspended the
case pending the outcome of Shackelford's resentencing. (Id., pp.I 00-06.)
In Shackelford's criminal case, the state filed a Notice of State's Decision to Not
Seek Death Penalty on Resentencing ("Notice"). (#39398, R., pp.14-20.) Shackelford
responded to the state's Notice, contending he was still entitled to jury sentencing
because, according to Shackelford, he could only be sentenced to indeterminate life with
the first ten years fixed unless a jury found at least one statutory aggravating factor. (Id.,
pp.36-42.) Shackelford raised the same argument in his Motion for a Specific Sentence
(id., pp.99-101) and Resentencing Memorandum (id., pp.120-25).

The district court

rejected Shackelford's argument (id., p.139), and sentenced him to fixed life for both
murders to be served consecutively with each other and the other six non-capital
sentences (id., pp.144-48). The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Shackelford's fixed life
sentences. State v. Shackelford (Shackelford ID, 155 Idaho 454,314 P.3d 136 (2013).

Shackelford's first post-conviction case was initially given district court Case No. SPOl00366. (#31928, R., p.10.) For unknown reasons, that number was changed to Case No.
CV-2001-0004272. (Id., p.1387.) Additionally, for unknown reasons, Shackelford's
Successive Petition was eventually given the same case number as his first post_conviction case, Case No. CV-2001-0004272.
2
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Shackelford filed a pro se Motion to Set Scheduling Conference in his Successive
Petition case, notifying the district court that proceedings from his resentencing had been
concluded. (#42331, R., pp.180-81.) Shackelford filed a prose Motion to Amend with
an accompanying amended petition (id., pp.182-226) and a Motion to Appoint Counsel
(id., pp.226-27). The state responded by incorporating its prior pleadings and renewing
its prior Motion for Summary Dismissal. (Id., pp.230-34.)
The same day he sought to renew his Successive Petition case, Shackelford filed
his pro se Application for Post-Conviction Relief ("Resentencing Petition") challenging
the two fixed life sentences for first-degree murder, and requesting appointment of
counsel. (#42182, R., pp.6-9.) The state responded by requesting summary dismissal by
attaching its latest response from Shackelford' s Successive Petition case. (Id., pp.13-15.)
After conducting a consolidated hearing on the parties' pending motions (#42331,
R., pp.236-37; #42182, R., pp.21-22) and permitting Shackelford to amend his
Successive Petition ("Amended Successive Petition") (#42331, R., pp.183-25), the
district court denied Shackelford's motions for counsel and granted the state's motions
for summary dismissal (#42331, R., pp.238-48; #42182, R., pp.23-28). Shackelford filed
timely notices of appeal in both cases. (#42331, R., pp.249-51; #42182, R., pp.29-31.)
Amended notices of appeal were filed (#42331, R. pp.260-65; #42182, R., pp., 43-46)
because the Judgment in each case was not filed until after the initial notices of appeal
were filed (#42331, R., pp.258-59; #42182, R., pp.41-42).
Appellate counsel was appointed in both cases. (#42331, R., pp.254-56; #42182,
R., pp.36-38.) However, counsel filed a motion to withdraw in both cases because, in
Shackelford's Successive Petition appeal, counsel "determined that [he] cannot file an

5

opening brief raising all the issues [ ] Shackelford wishes to present to the Court and
comply with I.AR. 11.2(a)" (Appendix A, p. l ), and in the Resentencing Petition appeal,
counsel "determined that [he] cannot file an opening brief and comply with I.AR. l l .2(a)
(Appendix B, p.1). Counsel's motions were granted (Appendices C, D), and the appeals
were consolidated by the Idaho Supreme Court (Appendix E).

ISSUES

The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Has Shackelford failed to establish the district court erred by summarily
dismissing his Amended Successive Petition because he has failed to address all
of the reasons for the district court's denial of his Amended Successive Petition,
and because the claims are barred by LC. § 19-4901(b), the doctrine of res
judicata, and/or I.C. § 19-4908?

2.

Has Shackelford failed to establish the district court erred by summarily
dismissing his Resentencing Petition because the claim is barred by I.C. § 194901(b) and fails on the merits?

3.

Has Shackelford failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by
denying him appointed counsel during his successive post-conviction case?

ARGUMENT

I.
Shackelford Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred Bv Summarily Dismissing
His Amended Successive Petition
A

Introduction
The district court identified seven claims from Shackelford's Amended

Successive Petition, which include:
(i) [T]his court erred in instructing the jury on accomplice liability in
Instruction No. 33, (ii) ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object
to Instruction No. 33, (iii) the State failed to disclose forensic evidence to
Shackelford, violating his due process rights, (iv) ineffective assistance of
counsel in failing to impeach Lucien Haag and failing to independently
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investigate forensic evidence, (v) prosecutorial misconduct in vouching
for witness credibility, (vi) the court's sentencing for the conspiracy count
exceeded the maximum allowed by law, and (vii) ineffective assistance of
post-conviction counsel.
(#42331, R., p.239.) The court dismissed the claims under several different theories,
including: (1) res judicata because some claims were raised in Shackelford's prior
appeal; (2) LC. § 19-4901(b) because some claims could have been raised in his prior
direct appeal; and/or (3) they fail on the merits. (Id., pp.241-46.)
On appeal, Shackelford has only raised the following claims: (1) whether the
district court erred in dismissing his claim regarding Instruction 33 (Claim A); (2)
whether the district erred by failing to rule on his ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claim based upon Instruction 33 (Claim B); (3) whether the district court erred by
dismissing his claims regarding alleged Brady3 violations (Claim C); (4) whether the
district court erred in dismissing his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim for
allegedly failing to investigate ballistics data (Claim D); (5) whether the district court
erred in dismissing his prosecutorial misconduct claim based upon alleged vouching
during closing argument (Claim E); and (6) whether the district court erred by dismissing
his sentencing claim regarding conspiracy to commit murder (Claim F); he has not raised
the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel claim or an ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel claim that was raised in his Amended Successive Petition.
Because Shackelford has failed to address the district court's alternative basis for
dismissing Claims A, C, D, And E, - they are barred under LC. § 19-4901(b) because
they could have been raised on direct appeal - the district court's decision should be
affirmed with respect to those claims. Even if Shackelford had addressed LC. § 19-
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Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1983).
7

4901(b), because Claims A, C, E, and F could have been raised on direct appeal, the
district court should be affirmed with respect to those claims. Moreover, several of his
claims fail under the doctrine of res judicata. Finally, all the claims in his Amended
Successive Petition are barred under LC. § 19-4908.

B.

Standard Of Review
In Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004) (quotes and

citation omitted), the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed the standard of review in postconviction cases in which summary dismissal was granted:
In determining whether a motion for summary disposition is
properly granted, a court must review the facts in a light most favorable to
the petitioner, and determine whether they would entitle petitioner to relief
if accepted as true. A court is required to accept the petitioner's
unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's
conclusions. The standard to be applied to a trial court's determination
that no material issue of fact exists is the same type of determination as in
a summary judgment proceeding.

C.

Shackelford Has Not Addressed The District Court's Alternative Basis For
Dismissing Claims A, C, D, And E
Relying upon State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208,210, 766 P.2d 678 (1988) (citing LC.

§ 19-490l(b)), the district court used an alternative basis for dismissing Claims A, C, D,

and E -they could have been raised in Shackelford's direct appeal. (#42331, R., pp.24146.) Addressing Claim A, the court, as an alternative basis for dismissal, explained:
Shackelford was able to complain regarding some aspects of instruction
No. 33 on direct appeal, and there is no explanation why the current
arguments were not raised then. Because these new arguments could have
been raised on direct appeal and were not, they are now barred in the postconviction action. Beam, 115 Idaho at 210, 766 P.2d at 680.
(Id., p.242.)
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Addressing Claim C, the district court, as an alternative basis for dismissal,
reasoned, "Shackelford's claims regarding this evidence are barred, because they could
previously have been raised on appeal, but were not." (Id., p.244) (citing Beam, 115
Idaho at 210). Discussing Claim D, the district court noted Shackelford "argued similar
points in his prior criminal appeal" and "offers no explanation as to why he did not
address the low mass bullet and Lucien Haag's testimony at that time." (Id.) As an
alternative basis for dismissal, the district court also dismissed Claim E because of
Shackelford's "failure to raise this issue on the prior appeal." (Id., p.245.)
When a district court provides an alternative basis for its ruling that is not
challenged by the appellant, the decision of the court must be affirmed. In Henman v.
State, 132 Idaho 49, 50, 966 P.2d 49 (Ct. App.1998), the petitioner filed a post-conviction
petition contending he was placed in jeopardy when his property was seized pursuant to
Idaho's Illegal Drng Tax Act, which, he contended, resulted in his cocaine conviction
constituting a double jeopardy violation. The district court denied post-conviction relief
on two alternative grounds. Id. at 51. On appeal, the petitioner challenged only one of
the district court's rulings. Id. Because the court's second basis for denial of relief was
not challenged in the petitioner's opening brief, the court of appeals affirmed without
addressing the merits of the lower court's first basis for denying relief. Id.
Similarly, in State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 365-66, 956 .2d 1311 (Ct. App.
1998) (quotes and citation omitted), the court of appeals addressed the defendant's failure
to challenge the district court's alternative bases for denial of his motion to suppress,
explaining, "where a judgment of the trial court is based upon alternative grounds, the
fact that one of the grounds may be in error is of no consequence and may be disregarded
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if the judgment can be sustained upon one of the other grounds." See also Brown v.
Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156, 165, 335 P.3d 1 (2014) (quotes, brackets, and citations
omitted) ("It is well settled that where a trial court grants summary judgment on two
independent grounds and the appellant challenges only one of those grounds on appeal,
the judgment must be affirmed."); State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 517-518, 164 P.3d
790, 797-798 (2007), abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional
Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011) ("Where a lower court makes a ruling
based on two alternative grounds and only one of those grounds is challenged on appeal,
the appellate court must affirm on the uncontested basis.").
While Shackelford later notes the district court dismissed his claims under LC. §
19-4901 (b) and Beam, supra (Brief, p.18), he fails to argue the court erred by relying
upon I.C. § 19-4901(b). Rather, without citation to any authority, Shackelford refers to
everything after the district court's initial basis for dismissal - res judicata - as "dictum."
(Brief, p.6.) This is incorrect because the district court's decision based upon LC. § 194901(b) is not "dictum," but an alternative basis for dismissal that Shackelford has failed
to address. Cf Petersen v. State, 87 Idaho 351, 365, 393 P.2d 585 (1964) (concluding
that statements in the court's prior opinion that did not appear "to have played a role in
the ultimate decision of the court" are dicta). The district court's discussion regarding
I.C. § 19-4901(b) clearly "played a role in the ultimate decision of the court."
Because Shackelford has not challenged the district court's alternative basis under
LC. § 19-4901(b), the district court's decision regarding those claims must be affirmed.
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D.

Shackelford's Substantive Claims Are Barred Under LC. 19 § 19-490l(b)
Claims A, C, E, and F are substantive claims that should have been raised in

Shackelford's direct appeal

Relying upon LC. § 19-4901(b),4 the Idaho Supreme Court

has stated, "The scope of post-conviction relief is limited.

An application for post-

conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal. A claim or issue which was or could
have been raised on appeal may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings."
Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 725, 932 P.2d 348 (1997) (quotes, brackets and citations
omitted); see also Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 606, 21 P.3d 924 (2001) ("It is
well established that applicants for post-conviction relief are not allowed to raise issues in
post-conviction proceedings that could have been raised on direct appeal unless the issues
were not known and could not reasonably have been known during the direct appeal.").
Even if Shackelford had addressed the bar associated with LC. § 19-4901(b), his
argument would fail because Claims A, C, E, and F are substantive claims that should
have been raised in Shackelford's direct appeal. 5 Because Shackelford has articulated no

4

Idaho Code§ 19-4901(b) provides, in pertinent part:
Any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was
not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings,
unless it appears to the court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing
by affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief
raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and
could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier.

Because Claims B and D are ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, they should
not have been raised on direct appeal. In State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 375-76, 859
P.2d 972 (Ct. App. 1993), the court of appeals extensively addressed the issue of whether
ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be raised on direct appeal or postconviction, explaining, "it is generally inappropriate to raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction. Rather, such
claims are more appropriately presented through post-conviction relief proceedings
where an evidentiary record can be developed." The Idaho Supreme Court adopted
Mitchell's rationale in State v. Zaitseva, 135 Idaho 11, 14-15, 13 P.3d 338 (2000).
5
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reason why these four claims could not have been raised in his direct appeal, their
dismissal should be affirmed on appeal. See Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 474, 224
P.3d 536 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Barcella did not articulate any reason or point to any
allegation or evidence as to why the claim should survive the bar of LC.§ 19-4901(b).").
This is particularly true because Shackelford had notice from the state that his claims are
barred by I.C. § 19-4901(b) prior to the district court's ruling. In its Answer, the state
asserted the claims are barred by LC.§§ 19-4901(b) and 19-4908. (#42331, R., pp.5253.) In its Motion for Summary Disposition the state moved for summary dismissal "for
the reasons detailed in the State's Answer" and further averred that Shackelford "fails to
raise any issues that were not or could not have been raised in said appeal." (#42331, R.
pp. 73-74.) That motion was renewed after Shackelford filed his Amended Successive
Petition. (Id., pp.230-34.) Further, the state's position was reiterated at the hearing when
the prosecutor stated, "The successive petition ... doesn't allege anything that either
wasn't already raised in either prior post-conviction or appellate proceedings or could and
should have been raised previously." (#42182, Tr., p.18.)
Because Claims A, C, E, and F are substantive claims that should have been
raised in Shackelford's direct appeal, the district court's decision regarding these four
claims should be affirmed on appeal.

E.

Claims A, B, C, And D, Are Barred Under The Res Judicata Doctrine
The district court found Claims A, B, C, and D are barred by res judicata.

(#42331, R., pp.241-44.) In Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613
(2007), the supreme court discussed the purposes behind res judicata:
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(1) [I]t preserves the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the
corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice
litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it
advances the private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive
claims.
While "[t]he doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res

judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel)," "[s]eparate tests are used to
determine whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies." Id. Five factors are
required for issue preclusion, which include:
(1) [T]he party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the
issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in
the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually
decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits
in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted
was a party or in privity with a party to the prior litigation.
Id. at 124.
There are three requirements for claim preclusion, "(1) same parties; (2) same
claim; and (3) final judgment."

Id.

"[T]he 'sameness' of a claim for res judicata

purposes is determined by examining the operative facts underlying the two causes of
action. State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, ---, 343 P.3d 497, 505 (2015). "Claim preclusion
bars adjudication not only on the matters offered and received to defeat the claim, but
also as to 'every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit."'
Ticor, 144 Idaho at 126 (quoting Magic Valley Radiology. P.A. v. Kolouch, 1234 Idaho
434,437, 849 P.2d 107 (1993)).
The doctrine of res judicata has been applied in both criminal, State v. Creech,
132 Idaho 1, 9 n.1, 966 P.2d 1 (1998), and post-conviction cases, Schultz v. State, 153
Idaho 791,797,291 P.3d 474 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing cases). In Creech, 132 Idaho at 10-
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12, 15, the supreme court declined to address issues and claims that were decided in a
prior state appeal and issues and claims previously decided by the Ninth Circuit during
federal habeas proceedings. As explained by the court, "[W]hen legal issues are decided
in a criminal action on direct appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res

judicata from raising them again in a post-conviction relief proceeding. Similarly, when
an issue is decided in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the doctrine of res judicata
applies to prevent the issue from being addressed again by this Court on remand." Id. at
9 n.1 (citations omitted).
Likewise, the doctrine has been applied in the context of cases involving LC.R.
35. In State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 482, 11 P.3d 481 (2000), the supreme court
applied res judicata to a Rule 35 motion that was raised before the district court, but
never appealed, and then raised in a second Rule 3 5 motion that was appealed. The
supreme court reasoned, "the doctrine of res judicata can be applied to bar consideration
of subsequent Rule 3 5 motions to the extent those motions attempt to relitigate issues
already finally decided in earlier Rule 35 motions." Id. The court also rejected Rhoades'
contention that the second Rule 35 motion "is not the same issue litigated earlier,"
concluding, "[w]hile the two motions may be worded somewhat differently, they
nevertheless encompass the same issue: namely, whether the district judge erred in giving
Rhoades a separate sentence enhancement for each crime for which he was convicted,
rather than a single sentence enhancement for his entire course of conduct." Id. at 84 3.
The district court concluded Claim A was barred under resjudicata. (#42331, R.,
pp.241-42.) In his direct appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court characterized Shackelford' s
prior claim regarding Jury Instruction 33 as follows:
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Shackelford asserts that the district court erred in reading
Instruction 33 to the jury, setting forth a theory of accomplice liability,
because there was no language charging Shackelford with aiding and
abetting in the Indictment and thus there was nothing to put Shackelford
on notice to prepare a defense to these charges. He also argues that the
instruction was ambiguous because none of the instructions regarding his
participation in the murders of Donna and Fred, the arson, or the preparing
of false evidence directed the jury to find that he had aided and abetted
any of these crimes.
Shackelford I, 150 Idaho at 378.
Because Idaho has abolished the distinction between principals and aiders and
abettors, the supreme court rejected Shackelford's claim because Instruction 33 "stated
the applicable law ... [and] did not mislead the jury or fail to put [him] on notice of the
charge because I.C. § 19-1430 allows an aider and abettor to be charged as a principal
and 'no other facts need be alleged in any indictment' because the distinction between the
two is abrogated." Id. at 379.
Shackelford now contends Claim A in his Amended Successive Petition includes
the following additional arguments:
i). The evidence was insufficient to present the Instruction No. 33 to the
jury; ii). Submission oflnstruction No. 33 removed the need for the jury to
find the actus reas; iii). Jury Instruction No. 33 shifted the burden of proof
from the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element
of the crimes charged, and; (iv). Instruction no. 33, in combination with
instructions on conspiracy counts (IV & V) removed the need for the state
to prove that Shackelford, as either a principle or accomplice, committed
any of the overt acts set forth in the Indictment. (R., 190 - 200).
(Brief, pp.5-6.)
Shackelford's new arguments do not salvage Claim A under res judicata. The
Idaho Supreme Court's determination that Instruction 33 "stated the applicable law as
laid out in LC. § 19-1430 and [State v.] Johnson, [145 Idaho 970, 973, 188 P.2d 912
(2008)]," and "did not mislead the jury," necessarily covers all of the "new arguments"
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Shackelford raised in his Amended Successive Petition and is now raising on appeal.
The state was not required to establish the elements of aiding and abetting because there
is no distinction between aiders and abettors and principles. As such, Claim A fails under

res judicata both because it was raised before the Idaho Supreme Court and because
"new reasons" asserted to support a prior claim do not prevent the court from denying his
claim under resjudicata. Johnson v. State, 2015 WL 1881943, *3 (Idaho Ct. App. 2015).
As recognized in Andrus v. Nicholson, 145 Idaho 774, 777, 186 P.3d 630 (2008),
"[C]laim preclusion under the doctrine of res judicata is not limited to theories there were
actually litigated in the prior lawsuit." Indeed, in his Amended Successive Petition,
Shackelford only contended he was "provid[ing] additional factual and legal support for
the claim that Instruction no. 33 was improperly given." (#42331, R., p.207.)
Claim B was also properly dismissed under res judicata because the first prong of
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim involving jury instructions generally requires a
determination of the merits of the claim. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, Shackelford must show his counsel's representation was deficient and that the
deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The
first element "requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id.
The second element requires Shackelford to show "counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687. Because the supreme court addressed the merits associated with using Instruction
33 and found nothing wrong with Instruction 33 in Shackelford's direct appeal, the court
necessarily found there would have been no deficient performance associated with the
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instruction. See Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104-06, 190 F.3d 920 (Ct. App. 2008)
(finding deficient performance when trial counsel failed to object to an instruction that
lowered the state's burden of proof). Therefore, because the first prong of Strickland was
decided in Shackelford's first appeal, the entirety of Claim Bis barred under res judicata
because of issue preclusion.
More importantly, in his Third Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,
along with other ineffective assistance of counsel claims based upon jury instructions,
Shackelford raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon Instruction 33.
(#31928, R., pp.2589-92.) While there were no post-conviction claims raised on appeal
challenging counsel's performance with regard to the jury instructions, that is not
required for res judicata to apply. Indeed, in Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863, the supreme
court applied res judicata to a claim that was initially raised in the first Rule 35 motion,
but was not appealed, and then raised in a second Rule 3 5 motion and appealed. Because
Rhoades sought to "relitigate the same issue already decided by the district judge and not
appealed," the claim was barred under res judicata when it was raised again in the second
Rule 3 5 motion and appealed. Id. at 483.
Claim C, which is a Brady claim challenging the testimony of Dr. Robert Ciak,
was also found by the district court to be barred under res judicata. (#42331, R., p.243.)
During his first post-conviction case, Shackelford raised a Brady claim challenging Dr.
Ciak's testimony based upon the state's failure to provide notes from Dr. John Howard
that allegedly could have been used to challenge the time of death. 6 Shackelford I, 150
Idaho at 380-81. The supreme court concluded Shackelford's claim failed because he did

In his Third Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Shackelford made other
allegations involving Brady that were not raised on appeal. (#31928, R., pp.2543-47.)
6
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not establish how the evidence "would have undermined the testimony, nor how he was
prejudiced by any failure to disclose the note." Id. at 381. Because the supreme court
addressed the prejudice prong of the Brady claim and "claim preclusion" is "not limited
to theories that were actually litigated in the prior suit," Andrus, 145 Idaho at 777, the
district court did not err by rejecting Claim C under res judicata.
Additionally, Shackelford raised this exact issue in his Second Addendum to
Third Amended Petition. (#31928, R., pp.3219-21.) While the district court denied
Shackelford's motion to file the Second Addendum (id., pp.3438-41), he did not appeal
the denial of the motion or otherwise challenge the merits of the claim. As a result,
Claim C falls under Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863, because Shackelford is attempting to
relitigate the same issue that was rejected by the district court and not appealed when it
was raised in the Second Addendum.
Shackelford contends res judicata does not bar consideration of the merits of
Claim C because of ineffective assistance of post-conviction and appellate counsel.
(Brief, p.11.) However, the state is unaware of any authority, and none is cited by
Shackelford, that excuses a claim dismissed based upon res judicata because of the
alleged ineffectiveness of post-conviction or appellate counsel.
As recognized by the district court (#42331, R., p.244), Claim D is also barred by

res judicata. On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, Shackelford contended
trial counsel were ineffective for failing to impeach two other witnesses. 7 Shackelford I,
150 Idaho at 384.

Addressing the issue of prejudice, the supreme court rejected

In his Third Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Shackelford made many
other allegations of ineffective assistance based upon trial counsels' cross-examination of
witnesses. (#31928, R., pp.2565-71.)
7
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Shackelford's claim, explaining, "counsel were not ineffective in the impeachment of the
State's witnesses as Shackelford has not demonstrated that counsel's conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result." Id. (quotes and citation omitted).

The

supreme court also discussed the claim associated with counsel's alleged failure to
properly prepare the defense expert witness, and concluded Shackelford "was not
prejudiced by any deficiencies in counsel's preparation of Perkins." Id. at 385. Because
the supreme court addressed the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims and "claim preclusion" is "not limited to theories that were actually
litigated in the prior suit," Andrus, 145 Idaho at 777, the district court did not err by
rejecting Claim D under res judicata.
Claim D was also raised in Shackelford's Second Addendum, which was rejected
by the district court but not raised in his capital appeal.

(#31928, pp.3216-19.)

Therefore, because Shackelford is attempting to relitigate the same issue that was rejected
by the district court and not appealed when it was raised in the Second Addendum, it is
barred under resjudicata. Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863.
Shackelford has failed to establish the district court's rationale for dismissing
these four claims based upon res judicata was error.

F.

All Of Shackelford's Claims Are Barred Under LC. § 19-4908
Because the district court concluded Shackelford's claims had been previously

raised and were barred under res judicata or were claims that should have been raised in
his direct appeal under LC. § 19-4901 (b ), it appears the court may not have relied upon
LC. § 19-4908 as a basis to dismiss Shackelford's Amended Successive Petition. (Id.,
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pp.238-48.) Irrespective, should any of Shackelford's claims fall outside the res judicata
doctrine or LC. § 19-490l(b), this Court can still affirm the district court under LC. § 194908 because the state provided proper notice in its Motion for Summary Dismissal.
Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) permits the district court to "grant a motion by either
party for summary disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together
with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." When the state files a motion
for summary disposition that "state[s] with particularity the grounds therefore," the
district court is absolved of providing twenty-days notice of its intent to dismiss as
required by LC. § 19-4906(b). Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d
795 (1995) (citation omitted). The "particularity" requirement does not require detail, but
only "reasonable particularity" that limits the opposing party from asserting "surprise or
prejudice." DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,601,200 P.3d 1148 (2009).
Even if the district court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, this
Court may affirm the order based upon the correct theory. Murray v. State, 156 Idaho
159, 164, 321 P.3d 709 (2014). In Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381, 385, 924 P.2d 1225
(Ct. App. 1996), the court of appeals affirmed based upon an alternative basis that was
properly pled in the state's motion to dismiss even though that alternative basis was not
relied upon by the district court. Therefore, if Shackelford had sufficient notice of a
theory of dismissal based upon the state's pleadings, this Court can affirm even if that
theory was not addressed by the district court.
Idaho Code§ 19-4908 states:
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All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must
be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any
ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or
sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief
may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a
ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or
was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended
application.
In its Motion for Summary Dismissal, the state specifically stated its basis for
dismissal was "the reasons detailed in the State's Answer." (#42332, R., p.73.) In its
Answer, the state averred, "the issues [Shackelford] attempts to raise were either
previously raised and addressed or have been waived, and there is no basis alleged to
support a finding that 'sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the
original, supplemental or amended application' for any of the instant claimed grounds for
relief. See Idaho Code § 19-4908." (Id., p.49.) Moreover, as an affirmative defense the
state asserted, "To the extent [Shackelford's] claims should have been raised in the
original post-conviction proceeding or on direct appeal, the claims are procedurally
defaulted, barred as res judicata, and collaterally and statutorily estopped. Idaho Code §§
19-4901(b) and 19-4908." (Id., pp.52-53.) The state's motion was subsequently renewed
after Shackelford filed his Amended Successive Petition. (Id., pp.230-234.)
The state recognizes that in Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322, the Idaho Supreme
Court reversed the dismissal of a post-conviction case because dismissal was premised
upon the state's answer.

However, Saykhamchone is distinguishable because in

Shackelford's case the state filed a Motion for Summary Disposition (#42331, R., pp.7375) that was subsequently renewed after Shackelford filed his Successive Amended
Petition (id., pp.230-34). See Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 823-24, 164 P.3d 798
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(2007). While the state's motion was based, in part, upon the "reasons detailed in the
State's Answer," as explained above, that answer provided Shackelford with "reasonable
particularity" that limited him from asserting "surprise or prejudice." (Id., pp.43-55.)
Therefore, contrary to his contention (Brief, p.31 ), Shackelford was given very clear
advance notice of a basis that could be utilized by the district court for dismissal of his
Amended Successive Petition. Because, all of the claims in Shackelford's Amended
Successive Petition could have been raised in his first post-conviction petition, the district
court should be affirmed. Indeed, Shackelford acknowledges his Amended Successive
Petition falls under LC.§ 19-4908 by its very caption, which states, "Successive."
However, if Shackelford can establish "sufficient reason" for not asserting these
new claims in his first petition, they may be considered on the merits. LC. § 19-4908.
The burden of establishing "sufficient reason" rests with Shackelford. Hooper v. State,
127 Idaho 945, 948, 908 P.2d 1252 (Ct. App. 1995).
Initially, Shackelford contends his "ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
claim could not have been raised in the first post-conviction petition because the appeal
from the criminal conviction was heard at the same time as the appeal from the first postconviction proceedings under the special appellate and post-conviction procedures for
capital cases." (Brief, p.35) (emphasis omitted).

Even if Shackelford's argument is

correct, see Hairston v. State, 144 Idaho 51, 57, 156 P.3d 552 (2007),judgment vacated
on other grounds by Hairston v. Idaho, 552 U.S. 1227 (2008) (because capital post-

conviction cases are governed by LC. § 19-2719, [i]neffective assistance of appellate
counsel claims, by their very nature, cannot be raised in an initial post-conviction
proceeding), none of the claims Shackelford has raised on appeal involve ineffective
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assistance of appellate counsel claims. Rather, the claims involve four substantive claims
two ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims.
Shackelford next contends ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is
"sufficient reason," and attempts to distinguish Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 395, 327
P.3d 365 (2014), which overruled Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955
(1981). In Murphy, 156 Idaho at 395, the supreme court held, "because Murphy has no
statutory or constitutional right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, she
cannot demonstrate 'sufficient reason' for filing a successive petition based on
ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel."

Shackelford contends that, because the

Idaho Supreme Court subsequently concluded capital post-conviction petitioners have a
statutory right to conflict free counsel under LC.R. 44.2 that is evaluated under the Sixth
Amendment, Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, 617, 315 P.3d 798 (2013), Murphy is
inapposite because Shackelford' s first post-conviction case was a capital case governed
by I.C.R. 44.2, while the rule in Murphy applies only to non-capital cases. (Brief, p.36.)
Shackelford' s argument ignores the policies the supreme court examined in
Murphy. Not only did the supreme court recognize there is no Sixth Amendment right to
the appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings even in capital cases, the court
discussed the policies behind that rule, explaining, "'The logic behind such a rule is that
if counsel for post-conviction proceedings, as well as trial and direct appeal, must meet
the same standards, then claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the immediate
prior proceeding may be raised ad infinitum."' Id., 156 Idaho at 3 94 (quoting Bejarano v.
Warden, 929 P.2d 922, 925 (Nev. 1996)). As further discussed:
"While it may be regrettable, we cannot guarantee every defendant
effective counsel for every claim that may be raised. Defendants have
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made a sham out of the system of justice and thwarted imposition of their
ultimate penalty with continuous petitions for relief that often present
claims without a legal foundation. As one court stated, 'We have created
a web of procedures so involved that they threaten to engulf the penalty
itself.' State v. Steffen, 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 639 N.E.2d 67, 73 (1994)
(limiting post-conviction relief for capital cases)."
Id. at 395 (quoting Bejarano, 929 P.2d at 925).
Irrespective of LC.R. 44.2, this policy applies to Shackelford' s case, and explains
why the Idaho Legislature earlier enacted LC. § 19-2719, which bars the filing of
successive petitions in capital cases unless the claims were not known or could not
reasonably have been known at the time of the first petition. LC. § 19-2719(3). As
explained in Beam, 115 Idaho at 213 (quotes omitted),

"The underlying legislative

purpose behind the statute stated the need to expeditiously conclude criminal proceedings
and recognized the use of dilatory tactics by those sentenced to death to thwart their
sentences. The statute's purpose is to avoid such abuses of legal process by requiring that
all collateral claims for relief ... be consolidated in one proceeding." Shackelford should
not be permitted to thwart Murphy's mandate or the policies of LC. § 19-2719 by filing a
successive petition challenging his underlying convictions and non-capital sentence
merely because he was not given the death penalty when he was resentenced.
However, even if this Court concludes ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel is sufficient reason for the filing of the claims in Shackelford's Amended'
Successive Petition, the district court should be affirmed because Shackelford has failed
to establish the SAPD was ineffective during Shackelford's capital post-conviction case.
First, the substantive claims Shackelford has raised - Claims A, C, E, and F - could not
have been raised or they would have been summarily dismissed because of LC. § 194901 (b), which bars claims that can be raised on direct appeal from being litigated in
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post-conviction. Because each of these claims could be raised on direct appeal, there was
no basis for raising them during post-conviction proceedings.
Second, Shackelford has failed to establish the SAPD was ineffective because he
has not established deficient performance and prejudice as required under Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687.

1.

Standards Of Law Regarding Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

The purpose of effective assistance of counsel "is not to improve on the quality of
legal representation ... [but] simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair
trial." Cullen v. Pinholster, --- U.S.---, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Shackelford
must show his counsel's representation was deficient and that the deficiency was
prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
The first element "requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment."

Id.

In making this determination, there is a strong presumption that

counsel's performance fell within the "wide range of professional assistance." Id. at 689;
see also Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9 th Cir. 2012) (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 739) ("We strongly presume 'that counsel's representation was within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance."'). Shackelford has the burden of showing
counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688.
The effectiveness of counsel's performance must be evaluated from his perspective at the
time of the alleged error, not with twenty-twenty hindsight. Id. at 689. "Unlike a later
reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of materials
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outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the
judge." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). "There are countless ways to
provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys
would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. "The
question is whether an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence under
prevailing professional norms, not whether it deviated from best practices or most
common custom." Richter, 562 U.S. at 88.
Strategic and tactical choices are "virtually unchallengeable" if made after
investigation of the law and facts. Strickland at 690-91. Strategic choices made after less
than complete investigation are unchallengeable if "reasonable professional judgments
support the limitations on investigation." Id. "Rare are the situations in which the wide
latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions will be limited to any one
technique or approach." Richter, 562 U.S. at 89. Counsel is permitted to formulate a
strategy that was reasonable at the time and "balance limited resources in accord with
effective trial tactics and strategies." Id.
In Strickland, the Court also discussed counsel's duty to conduct a "reasonable
investigation," which does not mandate an "exhaustive investigation." As explained by
the Supreme Court:
[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In
any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be
directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a
heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.

26

/

In Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) (quoting United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648, 665 n.38 (1984)), the Court concluded merely because counsel "could ...
have made a more thorough investigation than he did," does not mandate relief because
the courts "address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally
compelled." Therefore, counsel is not required to "mount an all-out investigation into
petitioner's background." This principle was reaffirmed in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S.
374, 383 (2005), where the Court reiterated, "the duty to investigate does not force
defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up; reasonably
diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further
investigation would be a waste." As explained in Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170,
1173-74 (9 th Cir. 1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added),
"While a lawyer is under a duty to make reasonable investigations, a lawyer may make a
reasonable decision that particular investigations are unnecessary.

To determine the

reasonableness of a decision not to investigate, the court must apply a heavy measure of

deference to counsel's judgments."
The second element requires Shackelford to show "counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

This requires Shackelford to demonstrate "a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding
would have been different.

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome," id. at 694, which "requires a substantial, not just
conceivable, likelihood of a different result," Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1403 (quotes and
citation omitted). A reviewing court "must consider the totality of the evidence before
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the judge or jury," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, and reweigh that evidence "against the
of available ... evidence," Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1408 (quoting Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003)).

2.

Shackelford Has Failed To Establish Ineffective Assistance Of PostConviction Counsel
a.

Deficient Performance Of Post-Conviction Counsel

As previously explained, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel,
Shackelford has the burden of establishing both deficient performance and prejudice.
While Idaho courts have generally addressed the prejudice prong associated with
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel by addressing the merits of the
underlying claim, it does not appear the courts have clearly addressed the issue of
deficient performance with respect to post-conviction counsel in capital cases.
As explained in Sexton, 679 F.3d at 1157 (citing Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556
U.S. 111, 127 (2009)), post-conviction counsel "is not necessarily ineffective for failing
to raise even a nonfrivolous claim," let alone a claim that is meritless. In other words, the
standard for ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is analogous to the standard
for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, where there is a Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel but no obligation to raise every nonfrivolous claim. Jones
v. Barnes. 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983). "Experienced advocates since time beyond
memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal
and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." Id. Based
upon these standards, while it is still possible to raise ineffective assistance of appellate
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counsel claims, "it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was incompetent." Smith v.
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259,288 (2000).
These same standards are utilized in Idaho to address ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claims. See Daniels v. State, 156 Idaho 327, 330-31, 325 P.3d 668 (Ct.
App. 2014); Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396, 386-88 (Ct. App. 2013). As explained in
Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 164, 139 P.3d 762 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Yarborough v.
Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)), "When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of
others, there is a strong presumption that he or she did so for tactical reasons rather than
through sheer neglect."
Through the SAPD, Shackelford filed a 108-page Third Amended Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief (#31928, R., pp.2534-2641), that was followed by an addendum
(id., pp.2980-90) and a motion to file a second addendum (id., pp.3175-82, 3196-3429).
Based upon the sheer size of the Third Amended Petition and the time it took to file,
coupled with the two addendums, it is difficult to envision how Shackelford has met his
burden of establishing that any additional claims, including those from his Amended
Successive Petition, were not winnowed out based upon tactical decisions. There is no
indication that the claims in the Amended Successive Petition were omitted because of
"inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of
objective review." Dunlap v. State, 155 Idaho 345, 384, 313 P.3d 1 (2013). Indeed, as
explained above, some of the claims from the Successive Amended Petition were actually
raised in the Third Amended Petition or the subsequent addendums. Therefore, there can
be no deficient performance on the part of post-conviction counsel when the claims were
actually raised, but appellate counsel winnowed those claims on appeal.
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Because

Shackelford has failed to meet his burden of establishing post-conviction counsel's
performance was deficient, he has failed to establish "sufficient reason" warranting the
filing of a successive petition under LC. § 19-4908.

b.

Prejudice Involving Post-Conviction Counsel

Because he has failed to establish relief would have been granted if any of the
claims in his Amended Successive Petition had been raised during his post-conviction
case (assuming they were not raised), Shackelford cannot establish prejudice.
Addressing Claim A, Shackelford contends the issues raised on direct appeal and
the Amended Successive Petition are "distinctly different" because:
The claim within the [Amended Successive Petition] boils down to
the prejudice suffered by Shackelford at trial where the meaning of the
jury instruction (a state law question) was distinguished from its impact on
the trial (a federal/constitutional question). Instruction no. 33 created such
ambiguity in the minds of the jurors when coupled with the conspiracy
instructions - that at least one (1) juror ( a paralegal by profession)
indicated that she would have voted not guilty on the First Degree Murder
count (and by default, the Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder) but
for Instruction No. 33.
(Brief, p.8.)
However, ambiguity associated with Instruction 33 was the very basis upon which
the supreme court denied the claim, stating, "We find this instruction stated the
applicable law as laid out in LC. § 19-1430 and Johnson. The instruction did not mislead
the jury or fail to put Shackelford on notice of the charge because LC. § 19-1430 allows
an aider and abettor to be charged as a principle." Shackelford I, 150 Idaho at 3 79.
Moreover, Shackelford's attempt to distinguish between "accessories" and "aiders and
abettors" is without merit because Instruction 33 did not address the question of whether
he was an accessory, which is entirely different than an aider and abettor. (Compare LC.
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§ 18-205 with Instruction 33.) Irrespective of whether the district court concluded that

"principals and accessories are subsets of accomplice liability" (#42331,

p.242),

Shackelford would not have been granted relief based upon any alleged error associated
with Instruction 33.
Moreover, Shackelford's reliance upon information allegedly from a juror during
the first post-conviction case is improper because it could not have been considered in
determining whether there was error from Instruction 33. First, Shackelford's argument
is not based upon first-hand information from the juror, but a note allegedly made by his
trial attorney, which is obvious hearsay and would be inadmissible.

(#31928, R.,

pp.3224, 3429.) Second, I.R.E. 606(b) prohibits a jury's verdict from being impeached
by affidavit or otherwise except where the verdict was determined by chance or where the
jury was improperly subjected to extraneous prejudicial information or outside influence.

See State v. DeGrat, 128 Idaho 352, 354, 913 P.2d 568 (1996); State v. Scroggins, 91
Idaho 847, 848, 333 P.2d 117 (1967); State v. Vaughn, 124 Idaho 576, 861 P.2d 1241
(Ct. App. 1993). "Statements regarding any other aspect of the jury's deliberations are
inadmissible to impeach the jury's verdict." State v. Webster, 123 Idaho 233, 236, 846
P.2d 235 (Ct. App. 1993). Because Claim A fails on the merits, Shackelford has failed to
demonstrate prejudice.
Shackelford next contends the district court "did not reference or otherwise rule
on" Claim B. (Brief, p.10.) While the district court may not have expressly referenced
the ineffective assistance aspect of the claim, it is clear the court implicitly rejected Claim
B when it rejected Claim A. Indeed, Shackelford concedes Claim B was "originally
presented to the district court in February 2005" in the second addendum. (Brief, p.10.)
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While the district court denied Shackelford' s motion to add the claims from the second
addendum, Shackelford failed to appeal that aspect of the district court's decision.
Therefore, just like Claim A, Claim B was barred under res judicata.

Regardless,

because the underlying basis of Claim B is Claim A, and Claim A is without merit,
Shackelford cannot establish prejudice.
Claim C also fails because, even if the evidence was withheld (which the state
denies), Shackelford has failed to establish a reasonable probability of a different result as
required under Brady and its progeny. See Kyles v. Whitlev, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)
("Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a 'reasonable probability' of a different result, and

the adjective is important."). As recognized by the district court (#42331, R., p.243),
while Dr. Ciak testified that the Donna's cause of death was the shot to her neck, he also
explained she was shot in the chest with a shotgun blast (#31928, Tr., pp.2178-96).
Moreover, the evidence upon which Shackelford relies, the affidavit of Dr. Roderick
Saxey, is unavailing. (#42331, R., p.224.) There is no information regarding Dr. Saxey's
qualifications, how he arrived at his conclusion, what additional information he
considered, or anything else other than a bare conclusion. Indeed, his opinion that "[t]he
cause of the deformity and shearing is not evidence on the radiographs and may have
been caused by ricochet of a hard object prior to entry into the body" is anything but
conclusive. (Id.) (emphasis added). Because Shackelford has failed to establish all the
Brady elements, his claim fails resulting in his failure to establish Strickland prejudice.
Claim D fails for the same reasons as Claim C - outside of Dr. Saxey' s affidavit,
there is no evidence establishing what additional investigation regarding the ballistics
data would have unearthed. Moreover, Dr. Saxey's affidavit is woefully inadequate to
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establish that additional investigation would have resulted in a post-conviction claim that
would have warranted a new trial by granting post-conviction relief based upon trial
counsel's investigation regarding the ballistics evidence.
Claim E raises a prosecutorial misconduct claim based upon alleged "vouching"
that would not have succeeded during post-conviction proceedings. Because this is a
substantive claim and trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor's alleged vouching,
this issue must be examined for fundamental error, State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, ---,
348 P.3d 1, 46 (2015), which requires Shackelford to demonstrate the alleged error: "(1)
violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without
the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,228,245 P.3d 961 (2010).
"Prosecutorial misconduct" "does not, per se, violate a defendant's constitutional
rights."

Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 781 (9 th Cir. 2012).

Prosecutorial

misconduct reaches the level of a constitutional violation only if the argument "so
infect[ s] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process," "misstate[ s] the evidence," or "implicate[ s] other specific rights of the accused
such as the right to counsel or the right to remain silent." Darden v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 168, 181-82 (1986).

"[I]t is not enough that the prosecutors' remarks were

undesirable or even universally condemned." Id. at 181. Rather, "the touchstone of due
process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial,
not the culpability of the prosecutor." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). In
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974), the Court explained:
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The consistent and repeated misrepresentation of a dramatic exhibit in
evidence may profoundly impress a jury and may have a significant
impact on the jury's deliberations. Isolated passages of a prosecutor's
argument, billed in advance to the jury as a matter of opinion not of
evidence, do not reach the same proportions. Such arguments, like all
closing arguments of counsel, are seldom carefully constructed in toto
before the event; improvisation frequently results in syntax left imperfect
and meaning less than crystal clear. While these general observations in
no way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a court
should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to
have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging
interpretations.
Shackelford's claim fails because he has not established prosecutorial misconduct,
let alone fundamental error.

Counsel have "considerable latitude in presenting their

closing arguments and have the right to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints,
the evidence, inferences and deductions arising from the evidence." State v. Payne, 146
Idaho 548, 566, 199 P.3d 123 (2008). Admittedly, closing arguments are not without
limitation. As explained in State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583 (Ct. App.
2007) (quotes and citations omitted):
Closing argument should not include counsel's personal op1mons and
beliefs about the credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Nor should it include disparaging comments about opposing
counsel, or inflammatory words employed in describing a witness or
defendant. A closing argument may not misrepresent or mischaracterize
the evidence, unduly emphasize irrelevant facts introduced at trial, refer to
facts not in evidence, argue as substantive evidence matters admitted for
limited evidentiary purposes, or misrepresent the law or the reasonable
doubt burden. The credibility of a witness may not be bolstered or
attacked by reference to religious beliefs, and appeals to racial or ethnic
prejudices are prohibited. In a criminal case, a prosecutor may not directly
or indirectly comment on a defendant's invocation of his constitutional
right to remain silent, either at trial or before trial, for the purposes of
inferring guilt. Lastly, and of particular importance to the present case,
appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of
inflammatory tactics are impermissible.
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The state acknowledges "a prosecutor should avoid expressing a personal belief
as to the credibility of a witness unless the comment is based solely on inferences from
evidence presented at trial." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 786, 948 P.2d 127 (1997).
However, that does not bar a prosecutor from "express[ing] an opinion in argument as to
the truth or falsity of testimony ... when such opinion is based upon the evidence." State
v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 288, 178 P.3d 644 (Ct. App. 2007); see also State v. Priest,
128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 P.2d 624 (Ct. App. 1996) (while a prosecutor may not "express a
personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence," a
prosecutor may "express how, from [the prosecutor's] perspective, the evidence confirms
or calls into doubt the credibility of a particular person"). A prosecutor's opinions and
arguments do not constitute vouching unless the prosecutor interjects "personal belief'
regarding the evidence or a witness' credibility, Timmons, 145 Idaho at 289, or asks
jurors "to make their decision based upon ... the prosecutor's self-proclaimed moral
rectitude and integrity rather than addressing the evidence," State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15,
20, 189 P.3d 477 (Ct. App. 2008). As explained in Timmons, 145 Idaho at 289, improper
vouching generally occurs when the prosecutor uses the words, "I think" or "I believe."
To the extent they can even be ascertained in Shackelford's opening brief, the
claims he raises do not constitute improper vouching. As recognized by the district court,
"most of the offending statements cited by Shackelford recited evidence produced at trial
and premised the credibility of the witnesses on their consistency with the evidence.
Thus it appears that the prosecution's closing arguments were permissibly based upon
reasonable inferences arising from the evidence presented." (#42331, R., pp.244-45.)
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Because this claim would have failed if raised during post-conviction proceedings,
Shackelford has not met his burden of establishing prejudice.
Finally, in Claim F Shackelford contends he cannot be sentenced to fixed life for
conspiracy to commit murder without the jury finding a statutory aggravating factor.
(Brief, pp.23-26. ) 8 Shackelford has a fundamental misunderstanding of the penalties for
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and the role of statutory aggravating factors.
Idaho Code § 18-4004 states, "every person guilty of murder of the first degree shall be
punished by death or by imprisonment for life." The statute further explains that if a
statutory aggravator is found under LC. § 19-2515, but the fact-finder determines
imposition of the death penalty would be unjust, the district court "shall impose a fixed
life sentence." If a statutory aggravator is not found or the death penalty is not sought,
"the court shall impose a life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not less
than ten (10) years."

(Emphasis added).

Idaho Code § 18-1701 explains that

conspirators "each shall be punishable upon conviction in the same manner and to the
same extent as is provided under the laws of the state of Idaho for the punishment of the
crime or offenses that each combined to commit."
Therefore, while a fixed life sentence is mandatory if a notice of intent to seek
the death penalty is filed and the state seeks the death penalty, the defendant is convicted
of first-degree murder or conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and the fact-finder
finds a statutory aggravating factor but concludes the death penalty is unjust, there is
nothing prohibiting the district court from exercising its discretion and imposing a fixed
life sentence whenever there has been a conviction for first-degree murder or conspiracy

Shackelford makes the same claim with respect to his fixed life sentences imposed for
Donna and Fred's murders after the resentencing, which will be addressed below.
8
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to commit first-degree murder, irrespective of the other factors required for a mandatory
fixed life sentence. State v. Wolfe, 107 Idaho 676, 680, 691 P.2d 1291 (Ct App. 1984);

see also Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612,620,262 P.3d 255 (2011). 9
Therefore, because this claim would have failed if raised during post-conviction
proceedings, Shackelford has not met his burden of establishing prejudice associated with
post-conviction counsel's performance.

II.
Shackelford Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing
His Resentencing Petition
On appeal, Shackelford has commingled the claim from his Amended Successive
Petition dealing with his fixed life sentences for conspiracy to commit first-degree
murder with his Resentencing Petition, which deals with his fixed life sentences for
Donna and Fred's first-degree murders, contending a jury was required to find a statutory
aggravating factor before fixed life sentences could be imposed.

(Brief, pp.23-26.)

Shackelford's claim is without merit. First, because this is a substantive claim, it is
barred by LC. § 19-4901 (b) since it could have been raised on direct appeal. Second,
even if not barred, it fails on the merits because there is nothing prohibiting the district
court from exercising its discretion and imposing a fixed life sentence.
As detailed above, this claim is barred by I. C. § 19-4901 (b) because it is a
substantive claim that should have been raised in Shackelford's direct appeal. Indeed, at
his resentencing Shackelford raised this very issue (#39398, R., pp.36-42, 99-101, 120125), but failed to raise it on direct appeal.

Because Shackelford has articulated no

A mandatory fixed life sentence could not have been imposed because the amendments
to LC. § 18-4004 were not enacted until 2003, well after Shackelford murdered Donna
and Fred, which would have resulted in a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
9
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reason why this claim could not have been raised in his direct appeal, its dismissal should
be affirmed. See Barcella, 148 Idaho at 474 ("Barcella did not articulate any reason or
point to any allegation or evidence as to why the claim should survive the bar of LC. §
19-490l(b).").
As explained above, this claim also fails on the merits because there is nothing in
LC. § 18-4004 requiring a jury to find statutory aggravating factor before the district
court can exercise its discretion and impose a fixed life sentence for first-degree murder,
particularly when the state withdraws its notice of intent to seek the death penalty and no
longer pursues the death penalty. See Booth, 151 Idaho at 620.

Because Shackelford's

claim fails as a matter of law, he has not met his burden of establishing the district court
erred by dismissing this claim in his Resentencing Petition.

III.
Shackelford Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Request For Counsel

During His Successive Post-Conviction Case
A.

Introduction
In denying Shackelford's request for counsel in his successive post-conviction

case, the district court stated, "It is ORDERED that Shackelford's motion for court
appointed counsel is DENIED. LC. § 19-852(2)(c)." (#42331, R., p.247.) Shackelford
contends the district court erred in denying him post-conviction counsel because the court
did not rule on his motion prior to summarily dismissing his Amended Successive
Petition, failed to give advance notice of its reasons for denying counsel, relied upon LC.
§ 19-852(2)(c), and he alleged facts that would lead to the possibility of a valid claim.
Any error associated with the district court's denial of Shackelford's motion is
harmless. Moreover, the state's pleadings provided him with adequate notice. The court

38

did not erroneously rely upon

§ 19-852(2)(c), but any alleged error in relying upon

§ 19-852(2)(c) is harmless because Shackelford failed to allege facts that would lead

to the possibility of a valid claim.

B.

Standard Of Review
A decision to grant or deny a request for counsel in post-conviction cases is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393.

C.

Shackelford Was Not Entitled To Counsel To Represent Hirn During His
Successive Petition Case
"A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is

governed by I.C. § 19-4904, which provides that in proceedings under the UPCPA, a
court-appointed attorney 'may be made available' to an applicant who is unable to pay
the costs of representation." Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393 (quoting LC. § 19-4904; citing
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792).

"The standard for determining whether to appoint

counsel for an indigent petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding is whether the petition
alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim." Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393 (citing
Workman, 144 Idaho at 529).

"In deciding whether the pro se petition raises the

possibility of a valid claim, the trial court should consider whether the facts alleged are
such that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to
conduct a further investigation into the claims." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654,
152 P.3d 12 (2007). The appointment of counsel is not appropriate for the purpose of
searching the record for potentially nonfrivolous claims; rather, the petition itself must
allege the facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim before the appointment of
counsel is warranted. Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393 (citing Swader, 143 Idaho at 654).
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Admittedly, the district court did not rule on Shackelford's motion for
appointment of counsel prior to dismissing

petition, but denied his motion in the same

Order that the court denied post-conviction relief. (#42331, R., p.247.) However, as
explained in Hurst v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 685, 214 P.3d 668 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting
Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467,469, 926 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1996)), this error must be
examined for harmlessness, which requires examination of Shackelford's Amended
Successive Petition '"to determine whether it presents any colorably meritorious claim,
the presentation of which might have been enhanced by the assistance of counsel."'
As detailed above, none of the claims in Shackelford' s Amended Successive
Petition are "colorably meritorious" because they are barred by LC. § 19-4901 (b), res
judicata, and LC. § 19-4908.

Because of these procedural bars, his claims "are so

patently frivolous that they simply cannot be developed into viable claims even with the
assistance of counsel." Hurst, 147 Idaho at 685. Even on appeal, Shackelford's appellate
counsel moved to withdraw because counsel "determined that [he] cannot file an opening
brief raising all the issues [ ] Shackelford wishes to present to the Court and comply with
I.AR. ll.2(a)."

(Appendix A, p.l.)

Because Shackelford's claims are "patently

frivolous," any error associated with the denial of his request for counsel is harmless.
Shackelford's claim regarding advance notice is likewise without merit.

As

detailed above, while the district court did not give advance notice, the state gave
sufficient notice by filing an answer and a Motion for Summary Dismissal that detailed
all of the bases for dismissing Shackelford's Amended Successive Petition.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 523-24.
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See

Shackelford's contention regarding LC. § 19-852(2)(c) is likewise without merit
§ 19-852(2)(c) 10 is "within the court's

Denial of court appointed counsel under

discretion" as long as "the court appropriately finds that the claims presented are
frivolous."

Swisher, 129 Idaho at 468-69.

When the district court cited LC. § 19-

852(2)(c), it was merely recognizing the necessity of considering "whether the facts
alleged are such that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain
counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims." Swader, 143 Idaho at 654.
The court's analysis regarding Shackelford's individual claims was an appropriate
finding that each claim is frivolous. Therefore, the court's citation of LC.§ 19-852(2)(c)
was not error. Irrespective, any alleged error was harmless since Shackelford has failed
to establish the possibility of a valid claim because, as detailed above, the claims he
raised in his Amended Successive Petition are barred by LC. § 19-4901 (b ), res judicata,
and/or LC. § 19-4908.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's dismissal
of Shackelford's Amended Successive Petition, the denial of his request for counsel, and
the dismissal of his Resentencing Petition.
DATEDthis 17llidayofSeptember,~;

~

L. LaMONT ANDERSON
Deputy Attorney General and
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit

10

Prior to July 2013, the statutory provision for the appointment of counsel in postconviction proceedings was codified at LC. § 19-852(b)(3). Effective July 2013, that
provision was re-designated as LC. § 19-852(2)(c). See 2013 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 220,
§ 2, p.515.
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